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I. INTRODUCTION
Global computer software piracy has become an enormous problem as
the computer software industry has grown at an ever-increasing pace over
the last decade. Software piracy is defined as "the unauthorized use or ille-
gal copying of a software product."1 In 1994, it was estimated that global
software piracy rates existed near 49%, and cost the software industry ap-
proximately $12.3 billion in revenue. 2 This led one commentator to state,
"[S]oftware piracy is the greatest single threat to the advancement of the
software industry."3
However, piracy rates have begun to decline. Between 1994 and 1999,
there was a 13% decline in software piracy rates.4 The International Intel-
lectual Property Association ("IIPA") estimates that in 1999, business soft-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor in May, 2002, from the Northwestern University School of
Law. I would like to thank my wife, mother, father and sister for all the love and support
that they have given me over the years. Without them, I never would have been able to
achieve all of my dreams and goals. I would also like to thank Prof. F. Scott Kieff who gra-
ciously reviewed and edited this article for me.
'Amy Choe, Korea's Road Toward Respecting Intellectual Property Rights, 25 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 341, 343 (1999).
2 Business Software Alliance and The Software and Information Industry Association,
1999 Global Software Piracy Report, pg. 8 (2000) at
http://www.bsa.org/usa/globallib/piracy/1999_PiracyStats.pdf (last visited October 24,
2001).
'Robert Holleyman, Software Piracy Abroad: Challenges and Opportunities, 453
PLI/PAT 419, 422 (1996).
' 1999 Global Software Piracy Report, pg. 1.
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ware piracy cost the United States software industry $2.7 billion.5 By the
end of 2000, this number had dropped to $2.5 billion.6 This reduction was
caused by several factors, one of which was the implementation of mini-
mum worldwide standards for the protection of computer software . This
global regime was largely established through the implementation and en-
forcement of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty ( "TRIPS" or "Agreement").8
A. The TRIPS Agreement
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property was signed on April 15, 1994.9 The Agreement was es-
tablished within the WTO framework during the Uruguay Round
negotiations. It provides for minimum levels of protection for intellectual
property, while still allowing member nations some independence in dictat-
ing their own domestic legislation.
Under the Agreement, developed nations were required to bring their
domestic intellectual property regulations into conformance with the
Agreement by January 1, 1995.10 Developing nations received a four-year
grace period before domestic legislation was required to be harmonized
with the TRIPS agreement. 1 This four-year window allowed developing
nations the ability to slowly phase in their new legislation in an effort to
make the process easier on their domestic systems. That four-year grace
period ended on January 1, 2000. Therefore, this is one of the first real op-
portunities to assess the global effects and success of the TRIPS agreement.
The developing nations now subject to TRIPS are: Antigua and Bar-
buda, Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te
' The International Intellectual Property Association, February 16, 2001, Appendix A to
the Letter to Mr. Joseph Papovich, Assistant United States Trade Representative Regarding
Request for Public Comment on the Identification of Countries Under Section 182 of the
Trade Act of 1974 (as Amended)("Special 301 ), 66 Fed. Reg. 3640 (Jan. 16, 2001) avail-
able at http://www.iipa.com/2001SPEC301CONTENTSLINK.html (hereinafter the IIPA
Letter). The IIPA is a coalition of seven trade associations including the Business Software
Alliance. Id.
6 The Global Piracy Report supra note 4.
7 Id.
'Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex IC: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, 15 April 1994 [hereinafter TRIPS or the Agreement: reprinted in Results of the Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations - The Legal Texts (GATT Secretariat (ed.)
1994.
9Id.
10 TRIPS art. 65.1.
"t TRIPS art. 65.2.
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d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salva-
dor, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras,
Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Ku-
wait, Macau, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philip-
pines, Poland (areas which were not reviewed in '96-'98), Qatar, Saint Lu-
cia, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and
Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. 2
Several additional developing nation signatories implemented their legisla-
tion prior to the January 1, 2000, deadline.
13
B. Advances and Continuing Issues
The TRIPS agreement made significant advances over the pre-TRIPS
international regime with respect to the protection of computer software.
There are at least two significant advances. First, computer software pro-
tections have been embedded into the new dispute resolution procedures.
Second, both object and source code are protected under the copyright sec-
tions of the Agreement. The dispute resolution procedures provide back-
end protection (protection after offenses have occurred), while new copy-
right provisions provide affirmative front-end protection (protection deter-
ring such offenses). However, the Agreement could have, and should have,
gone farther to protect the software industry. By not formally deciding on
the ability to patent software per se, the TRIPS agreement simply reiterates
one of the major shortcomings of the pre-TRIPS international computer
software protection regimes.
As this article will show, leaving the decision of patentability to the
sole discretion of domestic policymakers ensures that consistent global pro-
tection of software will be virtually impossible to achieve. To the extent
that countries offer the patent protection of software per se, in addition to
copyright and dispute resolution legislation, computer software will be well
protected by the overlap of the three. However, where patents will not be
granted for software per se, computer software will be underprotected. Fur-
thermore, this lack of harmonization will impose additional administrative
burdens on patent holders.
12 The TRIPS Council, REvIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/intel8_e.htm. One of the difficulties with this
note is that countries are allowed to self-designate as developed or developing. Therefore,
categorization under UN designations is not helpful. For many countries, it is not clear what
their designation is. To the extent possible, this note will delineate between designated and
nondesignated countries as well as developed and developing.
"3 Id. See later discussions infra, in Part IV.d and V.b.1 and V.b.2 for the status of devel-
oping nation implementation.
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This article will discuss the underlying principals of computer software
protection as they relate to the Agreement. Then it will assess the status of
implementation under the Agreement. Finally, the article will highlight
several options that may provide better protection of computer software.
Part One will examine the history of international computer software
protection before TRIPS. This will include a detailed analysis of copyright
and patent protection under the two dominant pre-TRIPS global treaties. It
will also critique the old dispute resolution system.
Part Two will discuss the new dispute resolution mechanism set up un-
der TRIPS. This mechanism will provide new avenues through which
member nations can force other signatories to adopt compliant legislation.
It also allows member nations to examine and challenge the domestic pro-
cedures and enforcement that result from compliant legislation.
Part Three will review the issue of protecting computer software under
the TRIPS copyright provisions. Moving from the time of TRIPS imple-
mentation to the present state of domestic harmonization in developing
countries, this comment will use the experiences of the developed world to
determine how well the TRIPS agreement has worked thus far, and its
likely impact in the near future. Some of the specific issues that faced de-
veloped nations during the past five years under TRIPS include the code-
behavior dichotomy, reverse engineering and black box testing.
Part Four will look at the way patent law under TRIPS has affected
computer software. This section will also move from the time of TRIPS
implementation to the present state of domestic harmonization in develop-
ing countries, and will use the experiences of the developed world to deter-
mine how well the TRIPS agreement has worked thus far, and its likely
impact in the near future. Included will be a discussion of the pure software
versus physical manifestation software issue (or the per se software patent
controversy).
Finally, Part Five explores various solutions to the current problems.
This includes exploring new legal hybrid paradigms and sui generis ap-
proaches. This section will also contain a discussion of emerging problems
that must be incorporated into any comprehensive solution to software pro-
tection.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE PARIS-BERNE REGIME
There are two typical legal schemes under which computer software
might be protected: copyrights and patents. Prior to the TRIPS agreement
there were two dominant international agreements that controlled copyright
and patent rights. Worldwide copyright protection was regulated by The
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works initially
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adopted in 1886 ("Berne Convention"). 14 Global patent rights were regu-
lated by The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ini-
tially adopted in 1883 ("Paris Convention"). 5
A. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention protects literary and artistic works under a
worldwide copyright regime. The Berne Convention protects the copy-
right holder's rights of reproduction, translation, adaptation, public per-
formance, public recitation, broadcasting and film. 7 The Berne Convention
accomplishes this by establishing minimum standards for copyright protec-
tion and guaranteeing national, nondiscriminatory treatment for copyright
holders of other member countries. 18
However, the Beme Convention left the status of the computer soft-
ware protection largely unanswered. For example, the United States had
developed a system of copyright protection for computer software as a "lit-
erary work" as early as the 1960's.' 9 The Berne Convention did not adopt
this system, or any other system, with regard to the copyrightability of
computer software.2 0 Therefore, it institutionalized a nation-by-nation ap-
proach to protection. This led to widespread speculation about whether the
Berne Convention even contemplated protection of computer software.2'
There are two major problems with protecting computer software
through a copyright regime. First, computer code is unlike traditional text.
Traditional text based copyrightable works "necessarily communicate the
ideas the work contain[s] . As commentator Charles McManis explains,
the value of the traditional copyrighted work, such as a novel, is derived
from the visible text itself.23 A person reads a novel or a book for the story
and images that are conveyed through the text on the page. However, this
is not the case for computer software. The true value of the computer pro-
grams is derived from the text or code that remains largely hidden from the
computer user. What is valuable is not the text, but the way the computer
"4 The Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971) [here-
inafter the Berne Convention].
"5 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1967) [hereinafter the
Paris Convention].
16 See generally, The Berne Convention.
'7 The Berne Convention arts. 9 to 14.
I81d.
'9 Franklin Pierce Law Center, Franklin Pierce Law Center's Sixth Biennial Patent Sys-
tem Major Problems Conference, 37 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 623, 681 (1997).
20 See generally, Charles R. McManis, Symposium: Article: Taking TRIPS on the Infor-
mation Superhighway: International Intellectual Property Protection and Emerging Com-
puter Technology, 41 VILL. L. REv. 207 (1996).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 234.
23 Id.
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interfaces with the user. Therefore with computer software, "'it is possible
both to publish a work and. keep it secret, and keeping it secret is part of the
way the commercial value of the work is maintained." 
24
The second problem is that the object code component of computer
programs could not be easily categorized as copyrightable material because
it existed somewhere between traditional copyright and patent areas. 25
Unlike regular text, or human readable computer source code, the object
code does not instruct the computer user how to perform a task.26 The ob-
ject code performs the task itself by directly interfacing with the computer
hardware. 7
Therefore the economic value of this part of the computer program is
derived from the information it conveys to the computer.28 It is not derived
from the information that is provided to the computer user. As McMannis
stated, "Historically, the only intellectual property protection available for
publicly distributed utilitarian works of this sort has been patent protec-
tion.,,29 The problem was that although the object code served a utilitarian
function (traditionally the realm of patents), it still existed as written text,
which is traditionally in the realm of copyright protection.
Because the Berne Convention did not affirmatively elect to protect
computer software as copyrightable material, individual nations were left to
decide whether or not to protect such works under the copyright laws. In
response, the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")30 devel-
oped a sui generis approach to the problem." Both France and Korea actu-
ally enacted such legislation.32
The United States rejected this sui generis approach. Instead, the
United States enacted legislation that protected both source and object
codes under traditional copyright laws and categorized them as "literary
24 Id.





" The two major conventions each established their own governing bodies. However, in
1893, the two bureaus combined to form the United International Bureaux (sic) for the Pro-
tection of Intellectual Property (best known by its French acronym BIRPI). On July 14,
1967, BIRPI officially became the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), under
control of the U.N. WIPO currently controls the administration of 21 treaties (2 of which are
jointly administered with other organization, including the TRIPS Council), and has 175
member states. World Intellectual Property Organization, General Information, available at
http://www.wipo.org/about-wipo/en/index.htmlwipo contentframe=/about-
wipo/en/gib.htm.
3' For a detailed discussion of the sui generis approach see infra Part V.
32 McManis, supra note 20, at 234-35.
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works".33 The European Union also adopted this kind of object and source
code protection in the European Commission Directive on Computer Pro-
grams.34 Given such strong support within the developed world for copy-
right protection for computer programs, it is not surprising that this
approach was the one adopted in the TRIPS agreement.35
B. The Paris Convention
The Paris Convention was the worldwide patent protection regime until
the promulgation of the TRIPS Agreement.36 Article 1(2) defines industrial
property as "patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service
marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of origin, and the
repression of unfair competition."
37
Like the Berne Convention, it requires that all member countries pro-
vide national, nondiscriminatory treatment to patent holders of other mem-
ber countries. 38 This treatment must be equal to the level of protection that
the member country chooses to provide for its own citizens.39The Paris
Convention also establishes the right of priority for applications from mem-
ber countries4°, grace periods for payment of fees and renewals 4' and some
limitations on exclusive patent rights42.
However, the Paris Convention generally failed to establish a truly
workable international patent structure. First, the Paris Convention did not
specifically define what can or cannot be patented.43  Second, the Paris
Convention did not establish any term for patents." In fact, patent terms
ranged from five to twenty years among the member countries. 5 By failing
to establish such minimum standards, especially with regard to what is ac-
tually patentable, the Paris Convention left global patent protection gener-
ally, and computer software protection specifically, in a state of uncertainty.
"3 See generally, Franklin Pierce Law Center, supra note 19.
14 See Council Directive 91/250 of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, O.J. (L122/42) [hereinafter EC Directive].
3 5 See TRIPS art. 10.
3 See generally the Paris Convention.
3 Paris Convention, art. 1(2) (emphasis added).
3 Id. at art. 3.
39 Id. at art. 2.
40 Id. at art. 3.
41 Id. at art. 5.
42 Id.
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There were two schools of thought on whether computer software
could be patented.46 The first set of nations provided that computer soft-
ware could only be patented if it produced some kind of real world me-
chanical result.47 The second set of countries allowed software to be
patented per se as long as it satisfied the traditional definition and require-
ments for patents.48 The Paris Convention did nothing to clarify this dis-
pute, thus leaving the issue unresolved.49
C. Problems Found Under Both the Paris and Berne Conventions
Another problem, which existed under both the Paris and Berne Con-
ventions is that neither one established an effective dispute resolution
mechanism. ° Dispute resolution under the Paris-Berne regime was limited
to private actions between individual parties in domestic courts of member
countries or the International Court of Justice."1 Clearly, those countries
with sufficient legal systems provided satisfactory justice when issues
arose.5 2 However, many of the signatories did not have adeq5uate courts and
could not be relied upon as fair adjudicators of these issues.'
III. THE TRIPS DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM
A. The Dispute Resolution Regime Established Under TRIPS Provides
Computer Software Industries with a More Effective Enforcement and
Review Mechanism
As was discussed in Section II, one of the major concerns under the
Paris-Berne regime was that there was no effective dispute resolution
mechanism in place. TRIPS clearly remedies this problem. As one com-
mentator noted, "Berne [and Paris] ... provide[d] no effective remedies -
except litigation before the International Court of Justice - for copyright in-
fringement. TRIPS fulfills this need by mandating the creation of enforce-
ment mechanism in domestic law and by adding the teeth of WTO's dispute
settlement machinery."54  All signatories, especially computer software
producers in member countries, stand to benefit from the advances.
46 See generally, the discussion of patents, infra section V.
47 Id.
48 Id.
"See generally the Paris Convention.
o McManis, supra note 19, at 215.
5' Id. at 227.
52 Id.
53 Id.
14 Tuan N. Samahon, TRIPS Copyright Dispute Settlement After the Transition and Mora-
torium: Nonviolation and Situation Complaints Against Developing Countries, 31 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BUs. 1051, 1055 (2000).
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B. The General Structure of the Dispute Resolution Mechanism
Article 64.1 of the TRIPS agreement formally adopts the GATT dis-
pute resolution mechanism as established under Articles XXII and XXIII of
the GATT. 55 However, a five-year moratorium was placed on any nonvio-
lation and situation complaints in order to allow signatories some latitude in
establishing workable domestic systems.
56
The TRIPS dispute settlement system establishes both the procedure
and causes of action which any state may invoke as part of their TRIPS
membership." Of course, there is no reason that individual disputes may
not be settled privately. 8 In fact, in the face of international sanctions and
heightened scrutiny, it may be in the best interests of all parties to come to a
mutually satisfactory private remedy rather than resorting to the TRIPS
resolution system.59
However, if one of the members elects to use the dispute settlement
system, one of the most powerful modes of software protection is found in
Article XXIII(b) of the GATT.60 Article XXIII(b) allows complaints for
nullification or impairment of benefits to be filed even where there has been
no explicit violation of a relevant agreement, a "nonviolation or situation
complaint."
61
This gives computer software makers the ability to not only challenge
the validity of the text of domestic legislation, but also the way in which
that legislation is being implemented and enforced (or the lack thereof) in a
member country. This highlights one of the key differences between dis-
pute resolution under GATT and under TRIPS.
Under the GATT, member nations only had the duty not to regulate
trade or tariff goods.62 In effect, this was a passive obligation because it
only put a restraint on governmental action.63 However, the TRIPS agree-
ment is an active obligation that requires states to continuously regulate and
" TRIPS Art. 64.1 states, "[t]he provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settling Un-
derstanding shall apply under this Agreement except as otherwise specifically provided
herein."
56 Samahon, supra note 54, at 1055.
See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, art. 23.1, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND,
supra note 9, at 404, 425 (1994), 33 I.L.M. at 1226, 1241 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
" McManis, supra note 19, at 230.
59 Id.60Id. at 228.
62 GATT art. XXIII(b). Situation and nonviolation complaints are those that do not in-
volve an infraction of an actual TRIPS obligation, but focus more on how those obligations
are being implemented on the ground. See generally, Somohan, supra note 54.
62 Samahon, supra, note 54, at 1068.
63 Id.
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monitor legislation, procedure and enforcement of intellectual property
rights.
64
One of the potential outcomes of this system is a significant impact on
state sovereignty. Tuan Samahon believes that a "duty to regulate may im-
plicate the actual functioning of a state's judicial system. For example, a
state's backlog in all cases, not just copyright suits, might require a revamp-
ing of the judicial system - or perhaps the invention of speedy justice for
copyright owners - in order to avert a situation complaint." 5
This unique aspect of the TRIPS dispute resolution regime ensures
greater power by member nations to ensure strict compliance with the
Agreement. Additionally, it appears that it can be used by the computer
software industry to ensure that member nations eliminate software piracy
by the enactment of domestic legislation, as well as "on the ground" im-
plementation and enforcement actions.
Furthermore, TRIPS Article 67 provides that situation and nonviolation
complaints do not have to simply be resolved by sanctions and other pun-
ishment remedies.66 Rather, responses may include making technical re-
sources available to the violator in order to ensure compliance.67 This
might occur in situations where complaints arise not from a willful viola-
tion, but rather where the country is unable to properly enforce the laws be-
68cause of lack of funds, lack of adequate police or judicial systems, etc.
C. The TRIPS Dispute Settlement Body has been Provided with Extensive
Powers that will Aid in the Resolution of Many Matters
TRIPS incorporates four additional powers for its Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) that will aid in the resolution of disputes.69 First, the DSB has
the ability to establish resolution panels whose.purpose is to adjudicate mat-
ters among members.7 ° Second, the DSB can adopt and enforce the reports
of those resolution panels, as well as any appellate bodies it creates.7'
Third, the DSB can maintain surveillance of the implementation of rulings
and recommendations.72  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the
DSB's ability to authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations
under the Agreements.73 This power also includes the ability to impose
A Id.
65 Id.
6 See TRIPS art. 67.
67 See generally, DSU.
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cross-sectorial retaliation in physical goods areas.7 4 When these four ad-
vances are viewed in light of the other changes in the dispute resolution
mechanism, it is clear that the TRIPS dispute settlement regime has real
"teeth."
Article 3 of the Understanding on Dispute Settlement also allows the
DSB to rule based on the "customary rules of interpretation" of the TRIPS
agreement, so long as it is not inconsistent with the Agreement itself.75
This allows the DSB to adopt existing international, national or regional in-
terpretations of TRIPS language in an effort to build upon the experience of
member countries.76
As technology continues to advance, Article 3 provides the DSB the
ability to pick and choose from the various solutions that have been adopted
by individual members. This basically gives the DSB the power to watch
as living experiments are conducted in member countries, and then adopt
the most successful interpretations for general application to all members.
Because computer technology tends to change so rapidly, this allows poli-
cymakers the needed freedom to find specific interpretations that appear to
best effectuate the goals of the Agreement.
IV. TRIPS COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
A. Significant Computer Software Protection Exists by Using the TRIPS
Copyright Sections
Under the Berne Convention, computer software was not protected as a
copyrightable work.77 Therefore, individual members decided whether or
not to extend this type of protection. The TRIPS agreement clearly protects
software as a "literary work."7 8 However, it only protects the source and
object codes, and leaves the computer behavior to the realm of patent law.79
Article 10 of the TRIPS agreement states that "[c]omputer programs,
whether in source or object code, shall be protected as literary works under
the Berne Convention." 80 Article 10 also clarifies many of the issues that
existed under the Berne Convention. 1 First, it specifically defines com-
puter programs as literary works.82 Thus, it ensures that computer source
' Somahan, supra, note 54, at 1072.
7s DSU art. 3.
71 McManis, supra, note 20, at 228.
" See Section II.A of this note.
"8 TRIPS art. 10.
79 Id.
80 TRIPS art. 10.1.
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and object code will have the minimum standards of copyright protection as
set forth in the TRIPS agreement8 3 Second, it clearly brings both the object
and source codes under the scope of protection (object code had not always
been included in other country's copyright protections).84 Third, it stops the
wholesale, verbatim copying of computer programs (whether that is copy-
ing the jrogram onto another disk or using one program on multiple com-
puters).
The TRIPS drafters had to walk a very fine line in selecting copyright
as the method to protect aspects of computer software. On the one hand,
they wanted to encourage research and development by ensuring a property
interest in the final product so that software producers had an incentive to
create.86 On the other hand, when copyright extends too much protection
over software it can give the holder a de facto patent not just on the expres-
sion, but on the underlying idea as well.' Given the long term of protection
afforded by copyrights,88 this would be a potentially crippling situation.
Because copyright seeks to protect the expression and not the underly-
ing idea, copyright protection was traditionally thought of as being inappli-
cable to useful articles such as object and source code.89 However, as in the
case of software, a copyright can protect useful articles so long as it does
not protect the underlying idea. The difficulty, when dealing with software,
is that often the idea and expression collapse on each other and cannot be
separated:
In the computer software context, the [idea-expression] argument is normally
transformed into an inquiry as to whether or not to copyright a program gives
the copyright owner a monopoly over some very important technological func-
tion. By extrapolation, the [U.S.] courts have tried to fashion the copyright
doctrine in a way that will not foreclose the development of technology in a
way that would allow the creator to monopolize the technology, as would a
monopoly on the patent side.90
Therefore, when the TRIPS drafters decided to protect the source and
object codes, they specifically denied protection to the program's behavior.
Doing so would traditionally be more appropriately protected by patents. 91
" For example, the minimum period of protection for copyright is 50 years under the
TRIPS agreement. TRIPS art. 12.
84 TRIPS art. 10.1.
85 See TRIPS art. 9.
86 See generally, Franklin Pierce Law Center supra note 19.
87Id. at 680-81.
88 TRIPS art. 7 sets forth a term of the life of the author and fifty years after their death.
88 See Franklin Pierce Law Center supra note 19, at 680-81.
90 Id. at 682.
"' A discussion of the difference between source code, object code and program behavior
is found later in this section.
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The behavior of the program is more closely related to the idea than are the
source or object codes.
If a computer program's idea is publicly available, it allows others to
easily make improvements on the program itself.92 Perhaps the greatest ex-
ample of this is the power and popularity of the Linux operating system.
The system started off as a grassroots, free program with an open source
(readable by anybody) code.9 Each user added their own individual parts
to the program and freely shared those improvements. 94 Had somebody
copyrighted the idea of the Linux system, they would have been able to ef-
fectively bar all second comers from making any changes or improvements.
If the copyright protection chosen under the TRIPS agreement were
too strong it would cause these kinds of improvements to cease.95 A de
facto patent type of protection would bar any future users or programmers
from making improvements to a product because the producer would be
able to control the use of the program to an extreme degree.96
B. Even Though the TRIPS Agreement Makes Significant Advances Over
the Paris-Berne Regime, Significant Hurdles to Effective Software
Protection Remain
The TRIPS computer software copyright provision significantly clari-
fied the crippling debate over whether or not computer software could be
protected as literary material under the Paris-Berne Regime. However, in
seeking to protect computer source and object code as literary text, the au-
thors institutionalized several important concerns raised under the Paris-
Berne regime. One of the major concerns was that copyright protection
could not adequately protect computer software because it is inherently dif-
ferent from traditional literary works. 97
1. The Behavior-Code Dichotomy98
Many commentators have strenuously argued against using copyright
protection for computer software.99 The major concern arises under what
92 See generally Pamela Samuelson, et. al. , Symposium: Toward a Third Intellectual
Property Paradigm: Article: A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994).
" B.J. Biersdorfer, Putting A New Soul In Your PC, N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV., March 1,
2001.
94Id.
" See generally, Samuelson, supra note 92.
96 Id.
9' See generally, Samuelson, supra note 92.
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has been termed the behavior-code dichotomy discussed briefly above.'00
One commentator, Pamela Samuelson, argues that the real value of a com-
puter program is not in its object or source codes. 10' Rather, much of the
real value of the program is in the computer's interface with the user, more
commonly known as the program's "behavior.' 1 2 The average computer
user rarely, if ever, looks at the source code, much less puts any value in it
as a literary work. The real benefit to the consumer is what they see on the
screen and how it interacts with them. For example, when a computer user
uses a word processing program, the value to the user is in seeing every-
thing that they are typing appear on the screen, checking the spelling and
placement of the text and printing the document out. The source and object
codes exist completely unseen.
Therefore, increases in the value of computer programs are the ever-
increasing behaviors that make programs easier for users to use, and which
complete more of the tasks which users' desire. 0 3 Thus most of the techni-
cal know-how or improvements lie close to the face of the program because
they appeal to users' ever-increasing needs for the way the program inter-
acts with them.'0 4 TRIPS copyright provisions, by explicitly protecting
only the source and object codes, do not protect the valuable behavior of the
program. Violations occur only if there is a literal copying of the source or
object code.'05 However, because TRIPS protects against this kind of literal
copying, it does provide for a level of security that the pre-TRIPS regime
did not provide.
2. Reverse Engineering
However, such literal copying is not likely, nor is it needed. Because
the behavior is not protected, any computer programmer can purchase a
competitors product, run the program and identify its various behaviors, and
then write a program that performs essentially the same tasks, but does not
literally copy the code. This is commonly referred to as "black box test-
ing.
Another variation on this theme is "clean room testing."'0 7 In clean
room testing, one group of programmers review and catalog all of the be-
haviors of a program. Then they give those descriptions to a second set of
programmers who actually write a program to perform those tasks. There-
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fringement because the second group of programmers did not actually copy
the code of the original program. Technically, they independently created
the same code by emulating the noncopyrightable portions of the original
program. These two presently legal forms of software development are both
potentially economically damaging.
However, black box testing and clean room testing are only part of a
larger set of reverse engineering practices that threaten the software engi-
neering industry.10 8 Notably, TRIPS is silent on the issue of reverse engi-
neering.1 9 It is also clear that by only protecting source and object codes as
literary works, reverse engineering is not affected by TRIPS Art. 10.110
Such silence basically affirms the practice of many countries that allow re-
verse engineering.
(a) Reverse Engineering in the United States
Two significant cases in the United States affirmed the legal use of re-
verse engineering. In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America.. and
Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade". the courts affirmed the use of reverse
engineering by means of decompilation and disassembly. The courts held
that such activity can constitute fair use under § 107 of the United States
Copyright Act of 1976 where the reverse engineering is necessary to access
unprotected ideas.'
1 3
In Atari, Nintendo of America, Inc. ("Nintendo") accused Atari Games
Corp. ("Atari") of copyright infringement. 14 Nintendo claimed that Atari
had reversed engineered Nintendo's 1ONES program. The program's pur-
pose was to prohibit unauthorized game cartridges from being played on the
NES system. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
stated that Atari could reverse engineer the 1 ONES program subject to three
conditions. First, Atari must reverse engineer from an authorized copy of
the program." 5 Second, Atari could only reverse engineer to the extent of
what was necessary to access unprotected ideas in the program code. Fi-
nally, the court stated that Atari could only reproduce protectible aspects of
the 1ONES proram to ascertain which information was protected and
which was not."
The court held that Atari had infringed on Nintendo's copyright. First,
Atari did not reverse engineer from an authorized copy. Rather, Atari had
"' See generally, McManis, supra note 20.
109 Id.
110 Id.
. 975 F.2d 832 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
'12 977 F.2d 1510 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
113 Id.
"4 See Atari, 975 F.2d 832.
11 See Atari, 975 F.2d at 843-44.
16 See id.
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improperly obtained a copy of the program from the United States Copy-
right office. More importantly, however, Atari had reversed engineered
protected expressions in the program, which the court found to be a clear
violation.' 17
Similarly, in Sega, Accolade, Inc. ("Accolade") was a competitor of
Sega Enterprises, Ltd. ("Sega"), in the field of computer game cartridges to
be used in the Sega Genesis game counsel. Accolade reverse engineered
several commercially available Sega Genesis games in order to identify a
way to make Accolade game cartridges compatible with the Sega Genesis
game counsel. The court stated, "[W]here disassembly is the only way to
gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted
computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such
access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of
law.""' The court found that reverse engineering was the only way for
Accolade to make its programs compatible with the Sega genesis counsel,
and that creation of these games was a "legitimate reason for seeking such
access." "19
The two cases stand for the principal that were the person or entity
seeking to reverse engineer the computer program obtains an authorized
copy of the program, and uses only the unprotected parts of the program,
reverse engineering is permissible.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office insisted that the Atari
and Sega decisions must be viewed as exceptional. 2 ° The office insisted
that the cases be interpreted as saying that reverse engineering is allowed
only when the copiright owner is engaged in anticompetitive use of the
copyrighted work. However, the courts rulings clearly extend beyond
this narrow interpretation and sanction reverse engineering in a wide variety
of commercial contexts.
(b) Reverse Engineering in Europe
The European Union seems to have taken a somewhat narrower view
of permissible reverse engineering.' 22 The EC Directive Article 6 states
that reverse engineering is allowed where it is: 1) necessary to achieve in-
teroperability; 2) performed by a licensee having a right to use or copy a
program; or 3) the information has not previously been available to any-
117 See id.
"8 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527.
12' Statement of Christopher A. Meyer, Senior Copyright Attorney, Office of Legislative
& International Affairs, USPTO, before the Consultative Committee on Copyright Issues
Relating to Computer Programs, Tokyo, Dec. 13, 1993.
12 Id. at 244-45.
122 Id. at 241-42.
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body under a license.2 3 These acts are largel' limited to the parts of the
original program necessary for interoperability. 24
Both the United States decisions and EC Directive walk a fine line be-
tween protection of the original computer software producer and hindering
the production legitimate advances or derivatives by third parties. The
United States and European Union appear to take a very similar pro-third
party perspective. TRIPS, by rejecting the copyrightability of program be-
havior, also implicitly adopts this approach.
Notably, several nations have passed legislation criminalizing inven-
tions and methods whose sole purpose is to circumvent anti-copying de-
vices worked into computer programs.1 25 However, this has not been the
norm, with the European Union notably not following this trend.
C. Developed Nations have Largely Implemented Legislation Protecting
Computer Software as a Literary Work, but have not Elected to Protect the
Behavior of Computer Software
Since the TRIPS agreement became binding upon the developed world,
it has become increasingly clear that computer behavior will not be pro-
tected by these legislatures. This means that these countries have simply
adopted the minimum level of copyright protection for source and object
code as set forth in the TRIPS agreement.
In the United States, the 1995 case of Lotus Development Corp. v. Bor-
land, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), stated that:
The fact that there may be many different ways to operate a com-
puter program, or even many different ways to operate a computer
program using a set of hierarchically arranged command terms,
23 EC Directive art. 6.
124 Id.
"' For example, the countries that have enacted anti-circumvention legislation are Mexico
(IP/N/6/MEX/I), Spain (IP/N/6/ESP/1), Sweden (IP/N/6/SWE/1), and Turkey
(IP/N/I/TUR/C/I). Under § 63.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, all legislation which impacts one
of the topics controlled by the Agreement (i.e., copyright regulations) must be sent to the
TRIPS council for publication and storage. Once received by the Council, they are subject
to review by the other members of the Agreement. The Council maintains a document dis-
semination facility, available at http://dosconline.wto.org/gensearch.asp. These documents
are searchable and viewable online. The document titles all have an IP/ prefix, designating
them as relating to intellectual property matters. All further citations to these documents will
include this format for the document title, as this ensures the easiest way to view the docu-
ments. However, the Council has encountered two serious problems in the notification and
review process. First, many nations have not submitted their legislation to the council. Sec-
ond, the review process will take several years. See supra, note 12. This author's review of
the legislation has found only approximately 60 member's notifications and/or reviews of
legislation specifically discussing computer software out of a total membership of over 130
members. Thus, analysis has been hindered by this fact. Therefore, this article will attempt
to ascertain trends from the information available at this time.
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does not make the actual method of operation chosen copyright-
able; it-still functions as a method for operating a computer and as
such is uncopyrightable. z6
Charles McManis believes that this decision stands for the principle
that copyright only extends to nonfunctional expression (object and source
codes).12 7 Functional aspects (behavior) must be controlled by federal pat-
ent or state trade secret protection.
128
The European Commission Directive on Legal Protection of Software
seems to take a similar position. Article 1(2) states that, "[i]deas and prin-
ciples which underlie any element of a computer program, including those
which underlie its interfaces, are not protected by copyright under this Di-
rective. 1 29 The key here is the rejection of "ideas and principles" underly-
ing a computer program's interface. This appears to be directed squarely
towards the behavior of computer programs.
Most of the developed nations have accepted the minimal level of pro-
tection as a "literary work" dictated under TRIPS.1 30 However, some coun-
tries have only protected software under their copyright regime generally
and not specifically as a "literary work". 31 For example, Turkey specifi-
cally stated that it is protected under the same category as literary works,
but it is itself not a literary works.
132
It is not clear whether the other countries that have not yet specifically
stated whether or not software is a literary work are following the Turkey
model, or if there is simply some confusion inherent in the TRIPS notifica-
tion and review process. In fact, it appears more than likely that all of the
countries controlled by the EC Directive (discussed above) will treat it as a
literary work. What is clear is that a substantial number of nations have
26 Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland, 49 F.3d 807, 818 (1" Cir. 1995).
,"McManis, supra note 20, at 238-39.
128 Id.
129 EC Directive art. 1(2).
M The following developed and nondesignated countries have specifically stated that
they will protect computer programs as "literary works": Australia (IP/Q/AUS/1), Belgium
(IP/N/l/BEL/1), Bulgaria (IP/N/1/BGR/C/2), Canada (IP/N/I/CAN/C/I), the Czech Repub-
lic (IP/Q/CZE/1), Ecuador (IP/Q(1-4)/ECU/1), Estonia (IP/N/l/EST/C/I), Hungary
(IP/Q/HUN/l), Ireland (IP/Q/IRLII), Italy (IP/N/I/ITA/1), Japan (IP/Q/JPN/Add.1), Latvia
(IP/N/l/LVAIC/l), Liechtenstein (IP/Q/LIE/I), Luxemborg (IP/Q/LUX/1), the Netherlands
(IP/Q/NLD/1), New Zealand (IP/Q/NZL/I), Norway (IP/Q/NOR/1), Portugal (IP/Q/PRT/1),
Romania (IP/Q/ROM/I), Sweden (IP/N/6/SWE/1), Switzerland (IP/Q/CHE/1), the United
Kingdom (IP/N/l/GBR/1), and the United States (IP/Q/USA/1).
"3 These developed and nondesignated countries are Denmark (IP/Q3/DNK/I), Ecuador
(IP/Q(I-4)/ECU/I), Finland (IP/Q3/FIN/1), France (IP/Q3/FRA/I), Germany
(IP/N/6/DEU/l), Greece (IP/Q4/GRC/1), the Kyrgyz Republic (IP/N/1/KGZ/C/1), Mongolia
(IP/Q(1-4)/MNG/1), Panama (IP/Q(1-4)/PAN/1), and Spain (IP/N/6/ESP/1).
132 IP/N/I/TUR/C/I.
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complied with Article 10.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and protected com-
puter programs under their copyright regimes.
Recently the IIPA sent a letter to the United States Trade Representa-
tive regarding nations that the IIPA has found that are not adequately pro-
tecting intellectual property rights. 133 Among them, the letter singled out
both Bulgaria and Japan for not properly enforcing the copyright laws al-
ready promulgated that relate to computer software protection. 1 4 This let-
ter highlights the fact that although the laws may conform to the TRIPS
agreement, without proper enforcement software continues to be pirated.
D. Developing Nations Seem to be Following the Same Trend as the
Developed Nations
To date, most of the developing nations that have reported their legisla-
tion to the TRIPS Council have provided at least copyright protection to
computer programs, and most have protected computer programs as literary
works.'35 However, several members have sent notifications that their do-
mestic legislation is not presently in compliance with the Agreement. 136
The IIPA again contests the success in harmonizing laws and ensuring
enforcement. Specifically, it points out that the Dominican Republic, 3
Egypt, 3 8Kuwait, Israel,140  Lebanon,'4' Namibia,14 1 the Phillipines,14 1
133 See generally, IIPA Letter, supra note 5.
"3 IIPA Letter, supra note 5, at 14-15.
13' The following countries have given computer programs copyright protection: Belize
(IP/N/6/BLZ/1), Chile (IP/N/6/CHL/I), Columbia (IP/N/6/COL/I), Iceland (IP/Q/ISL/1),
and Mexico (IP/N/6/MEX/1). The following countries specifically protect it as a "literary
work": Brazil (IP/N/l/BRAIC/1), Costa Rica (IP/N/1/CRI/C/1), Cyprus (IP/Q/CYP/I), El
Salvador (IP/Q/SLV/l), Estonia (IP/N/l/EST/C/1), Hong Kong, China
(IP/N/1/HKG/2/Add.1), Indonesia (IP/N/I/IDN/2), Israel (IP/Q/ISR/I), Korea
(IP/Q/KOR/I), Macau, China (IP/N/1/MAC/C/l), Malta (IP/Q/MLT/1) the Phillipines
(IP/N/l/PHL/C/6), Poland (IP/Q4/POL/1), Saint Lucia (IP/N/l/LCA/1), Singapore
(IPJN/l/SGP/C/I) and Trinidad and Tobago (IP/Q/TTO/l).
36 Burundi is not in compliance and is seeking a 10-year waiver (IP/N/l/BDI/I). Domin-
ica is not in compliance but has a draft bill in existence (IP/N/l/DMAI).
' IIPA Letter, supra note 5, at 80-90 (citing lax enforcement as well as certain prohib-
ited taxes).
131 IIPA Letter, supra note 5, at 91-103. While presently "considered a literary work", the
new draft Copyright Law would create a separate category for computer software, and it is
unclear if this would afford the same level of protection. Id. at 100.
139 IIPA Letter, supra note 5, at 142 (Kuwaiti law does not protect software as "literary
works").
140 IIPA Letter, supra note 5, at 121-33 (Citing that the Israeli government continues to
use illegal software, enforcement has been lax and the Copyright Law does not provide for
adequate criminal remedies.).
141 IIPA Letter, supra note 5, at 150 (stating that Article 25 of the Copyright law violates
TRIPS by creating vast exceptions to the protection of computer software).
142 IIPA Letter, supra note 5, at 13.
"' IIPA Letter, supra note 5, at 175-84 (citing lax enforcement).
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South Korea,144 Taiwan, 45 and Uruguay146 have all either not promulgated
language adhering to TRIPS or not properly enforced the Agreement.
As noted by the IIPA, many of the developing countries have amended
or are presently amending their laws to become TRIPs compliant. 147 This
suggests that although developing nations have not, as a group, achieved
widespread compliance, the movement certainly appears to be in that direc-
tion.
While a detailed analysis of the enforcement and functioning of copy-
right legislation protection computer software is well beyond the scope of
this article, it is important to point out that implementing legislation is sim-
ply a first step towards ultimate protection. However, it is in these very
situations where the legislation does not reflect the actual enforcement that
the dispute resolution mechanisms discussed in Section III may prove to be
the most effective tool in protecting software.
V. TRIPS PATENT PROTECTION
A. The Absence of Protection of Computer Software Through Patents was
Largely Unchanged by the TRIPS Agreement
The TRIPS agreement made some general advances in an effort to
harmonize global patent regulations. However, it did not confront the issue
of whether a computer program itself can be patented. This ambivalence
prolongs the question that existed in the pre-TRIPS regime, namely, can
computer software be protected as such, or does it have to have a physical
manifestation in order to be considered for a patent? Currently, this ques-
tion is left up to the individual signatories.
Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement states that patents will be provided
"for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technol-
ogy, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable
of industrial application.', 4' This definition of patents certainly does not
foreclose computer programs from being included, but it does not affirm
this notion either.
Several problems have been solved by the TRIPS agreement. There
are at least three areas of advances beyond the old Paris Convention Stan-
'4" IIPA Letter, supra note 5, at 211-23 (citing lax or even counterproductive enforcement
efforts).
' IIPA Letter, supra note 5, at 224-45. The report cites the fact that the Copyright law
does not define a computer program as a "literary work", id. at 242, and lax enforcement ef-
forts, see generally, id. at 224-45.
46 IIPA Letter, supra note 5, at 13 and 260-73. Uruguay does not expressly protect com-
puter programs as "literary works." Id. at 262.
See generally, IIPA Letter, supra note 5.,
'"TRIPS art. 27.
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dards. 149 First, TRIPS strictly forbids discrimination against any invention
that satisfies the TRIPS patent definition.15 ° Second, patents are protected
for a minimum term of 20 years. 51 Finally, discrimination based on the
place of invention is forbidden.'
5 2
However, because the TRIPS copyright sections only provide protec-
tion for the source and object codes, the ability to patent the functional or
behavioral aspects of the program have become the only vehicle through
which software developers can effectively protect their entire program.
B. The Pure Software Controversy Continues Under the TRIPS
Agreement.
The question of whether or not "pure software" (software having no
physical manifestation) can be patented, or whether it must contain a physi-
cal manifestation continues under the TRIPS regime. Some commentators
believe that TRIPS actually does resolve this issue. The discussion has re-
volved around the choice of words in Article 27.
What does the term "capable of industrial application"' 53 actually
mean?' 54 One of the footnotes to the text of the Agreement states that "ca-
pable of industrial application" is synonymous with "useful."'155 One com-
mentator believes, therefore, that it could be consistent with TRIPS to limit
computer software patents only to those software inventions that have some
form of an industrial application.
56
However, there is some evidence that this narrow interpretation is in-
appropriate. Article 2 of the TRIPS agreement formally adopts the Paris
Convention. 5 7 And Article 1 of the Paris Convention states that "industrial
property" must be viewed "in the broadest sense."' 58 This broader sense
certainly would leave room for patents to be awarded for pure computer
software, but certainly would not appear to require such an outcome.
Another commentator reiterates this confusion. 59 Bankole Sodipo ar-
gues that the pure software question does not necessarily revolve around the
"industrial application" language, but rather the "invention" and "techno-
"4 Sodipo, supra note 43, at 198.
110 TRIPS art. 27.1.
's' TRIPS art. 33.
5 TRIPS art. 27.1. This issue will be discussed later, but this provision forced the United
States to change its practices for the first to file patent system.
,' TRIPS art. 27.
154 McMannis, supra note 20, at 247-48.
TRIPS art. 27 n.5.
156 McMannis, supra note 20, at 247-48.
,57 TRIPS art. 2.
's Paris Convention art. 1.
'5 Sodipo, supra note 43, at 204-05.
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logical" language.1 60 If patents are allowed for any "technology," computer
software may receive patents because computers are a form of technol-
ogy. However, if it is related to any "invention" and not "technology,"
the United States and European Commissions stances will be upheld be-
cause "invention" connotes a physical manifestation.1 62 Without a concrete
interpretation, the language creates a level of uncertainty, allowing signato-
ries the ability to choose either to recognize pure software as patentable or
not. Some commentators believe that the uncertainty will leave most pub-
licly distributed computer programs unprotected.
163
C. Both the Developed and the Developing Signatories to TRIPS have
taken Divergent Approaches to the Pure Software Issue
Today, five years after TRIPS came into force for the developed world,
and just a year after it began to control the developing world there appears
to be little consensus on the pure software issue. The United States, as well
as several other countries including Nigeria and Australia, seems to be
moving more toward allowing patents on software.164 However, the Euro-
pean Union seems to be moving to bar patents on software per se.
65
1. There is No Consensus Among the Developed Nations on the Pure
Software Patent Controversy
The United States appears to be moving in a direction of allowing
computer software patents on programs per se. 166 However, the movement
has occurred slowly over the last three decades. In 1968, the Patent and
Trademark Office declared computer prorams unpatentable subject mat-
ter. They later rescinded this position opening up the possibility for
computer software patents.
Originally, "it was thought that because computer programs involved
math, which consists of universal principles akin to the laws of nature, pro-
grams were not patentable subject matter.' 69 This attitude is embodied in
Gottschalk v. Benson. 7 ° The Supreme Court refused to allow a patent for




'6 See generally, McManis, supra note 20.
6 See infra, Section V.B. 1.
165 See infra, Section V.B. 1.
166 Sodipo, supra note 43, at 203.
167 33 Fed. Reg. §§ 15609-10 (1968).
16' 34 Fed. Reg. § 15724 (1969).
169 James P. Chandler, Patent Protection for Computer Programs, I MINN. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 33, 41 (2000).
7
'See 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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tal computers.' 71 Similarly in 1978, the Supreme Court was again faced
with the issue of patentability of another computer software method, and
again refused to allow the patent to be issued.
172
This attitude began to shift in the 1980's. In Diamond v. Diehr, 73 the
Supreme Court allowed a patent to be issued for a program that both opened
a cauldron (the technical result), and included the software used to calculate
the precise temperature in the cauldron by means of an mathematical equa-
tion. Today, the United States allows patents for a wide range of computer
programs that include a physical manifestation. 174  As Bankole Sodipo
points out, "Today the US allows computer software inventions which in-
volve algorithms, as in Re Iwashishi, and the number of applications and
grants have increased significantly over the years.'
As an aside, there was yet another significant shift in United States
patent law that occurred as a direct result of the TRIPS agreement. The
United States and the Philippines both maintain a national patent priority
system based on the first-to-invent procedure. 176 However, the rest of the
world maintains a first-to-file system. 7 7  The old United States system
stated that the first to invent the patent in the United States received the pat-
ent. This was seen as a major obstacle against harmonization as it was bi-
ased against foreign inventions. 17 In keeping with the anti-discrimination
Article 27(1)of the TRIPS agreement, the United States has recently
changed its law to state that the first to invent in any country will receive
the patent.1
79
Europe seems to have rejected the computer software per se rule. The
European Patent Convention ("EPC") specifically requires member states to
refuse to grant patents to computer programs as such,8 unless the software
makes some sort of technical contribution.'' "The rationale is that whilst
mental acts and business processes remain unpatentable, inventions which
result in a technical end should not be discriminated against merely because
the technical end is effected by a computer program."'
8 2
"' See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. 63.
7 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (the Court refused a patent for a method of up-
dating "alarm limits" for a chemical process).
"7 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
See generally State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
"' Sodipo, supra note 43, at 203 (citations omitted).




IS' Convention on the Grant of European Patents (10 th ed. 2000) [hereinafter EPC] art.
52(2)(c).
181 European Patent Office Guidelines C IV 2.2.
82 Sodipo, supra note 43, at 204.
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Twenty-three developed members have notified the Council that they
will notpatent software as such.'83 Notable exceptions include the United
States,' 8 Australia 185 and Japan186. Most of the nations that do not allow
patenting are part of the European Union, but there are other geographical
areas represented.'8 7 Thus, it seems clear that most of the developed na-
tions do not allow patenting of software as such.
2. It is Not Clear Whether Developing Nations will Allow Patents on
Computer Programs Per Se
To date, very few of the developing nations have signaled whether or
not they will allow patents to issue on computer software as such. Nigeria
will allow patenting as such, however, Nigeria cryptically carves out an ex-
ception for inventions that are of a "scientific nature."' l8 8 Unfortunately, un-
til more developing countries notify the TRIPS Council of their legislation,
no discemable patterns have emerged.
VI. OTHER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PROTECTING COMPUTER
SOFTWARE
While TRIPS addresses the computer software protection problem un-
der copyright law, there are a number of other possible solutions that may
be more effective including the "compulsory patent" system and the sui
generis approach.
A. The Compulsory Patent System
TRIPS could have mandated that signatories protect software behavior
or functionality under patent law. The program could be patented per se as
long as it complied with the traditional requirements of patents set forth in
the TRIPS Agreement. This would have allowed the source and object
codes to be protected by copyright, and then the behavior to be protected by
patent. Such a regime could be used to protect the entire software product.
"' These include Austria (IP/Q3/AUT/1), Belgium (IP/Q3/BEL/l), Bulgaria
(IP/Q3/BGR/I), Canada (IP/Q3/CAN/1), the Czech Republic (IP/Q/CZE/I), Denmark
(IP/Q3/DNK/I), Finland (IP/Q3/FIN/I), France (IP/Q3/FRA/I), Germany (IP/N/6/DEU/1),
Greece (IP/Q3/GRC/l), Ireland (IP/Q3/IRL/l), Italy (IP/Q3/ITA/I), Mongolia (IP/Q/(1-
4)/MNG/1), the Netherlands (IP/Q3/NLD/1), New Zealand (IP/Q3/NZL!1), Norway
(IP/Q3/NOR/1), Portugal (IP/Q3/PRT/1), the Slovak Republic (IP/Q3/SVK/1), Slovenia
(IP/Q3/SVN/I), Spain (IP/Q3/ESP/1), Sweden (IP/Q3/SWE/1), Turkey (IP/Q3ITUR/1) and
the United Kingdom (IP/Q3/GBR/1); available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-search.asp.
's See discussion above.
t IP/Q3/AUS/1.
86 IP/Q3/JPN/l.
87 For example Canada (IP/Q3/CAN/1).
Id.
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Under such a system however, a 20-year patent term seems excessive.
The point is to provide an incentive for software producers, but not to stifle
future progress. Therefore, a term of 10 years may be more appropriate.
The 10-year term would allow computer program developers time to amor-
tize their investment,18 9 but not provide any long-term monopoly on the
product.
To some extent the term of the patent may be a moot point. With the
speed of advancement in the computer software arena, it is entirely possible
that any given patentable program will be obsolete long before the 10-year
patent period runs out.' 90 The apparent character of the software market is
an ever-changing program incorporating more complex behaviors.
One of the reasons that such a solution was not adopted under the
TRIPS agreement is likely to have been a strategic choice. Countries have
had diverging attitudes towards the pure software issue. Five years ago the
United States was patenting pure software programs while the European
Commission was preparing to bar the patents on pure software. Therefore,
it is not clear whether the signatories of the TRIPS agreement could have
agreed upon a measure such as the one above.
B. The Sui Generis Approach
The second possible solution is the sui generis approach. This system
has been extensively discussed recently, and, as mentioned above, been
adopted by WIPO and others.' 9' Perhaps the most accepted, as well as the
most debated, manifestation of the sui generis approach is "The Mani-
festo.
'192
The authors of the Manifesto believe that the present legal regime is
incapable of protecting computer programs because they are inherently
unlike anything the present system has ever seen:
Although incremental technical innovation has generally been left
to the rigors of free competition, the rationale for doing so has
been, apparently, the assumption that incremental innovators
would have some natural lead-time after introducing an innovative
product to the market, during which they could charge monopoly
prices. Such lead-time arose, in part, because manufacturers of in-
dustrial products embodying incremental innovations were able to
keep secret much of the know-how required to make their prod-
ucts. Allowing third parties to reverse engineer and appropriate
incremental innovation also substantially contributed to the cumu-
lative innovation process because those who reverse engineer often
' Franklin Pierce Law Center, supra note 19, at 694-95.
190 Id. at 695.
"9' See supra section H.A.
.92 See generally, Samuelson, supra note 92.
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introduce improvements as the reimplementation of another's in-
novation or learn how to produce the product more efficiently.
Even in the face of such competition, firms with lead-time gener-
ally receive enough return on their investment to provide adequate
incentives for incremental innovation.1
93
However, the computer software industry is not like this at all. The
computer software industry is built on incremental changes. These incre-
mental changes in the behavior of the program, which are its true economic
value, exist on the face of the program. This means that they can be easily
duplicated by other programmers through reverse engineering. Moreover,
the cost of producing the computer program, unlike other material objects,
is almost nothing.194 Therefore, present legal regimes are either underpro-
tecting programs by not providing producers with strong enough protection,
or overprotecting by awarding patent/copyright monopolies. 1 Underpro-
tection hurts software producers who cannot receive a return on their in-
vestment. Overprotection stifles innovation.
The authors of the Manifesto believe that a new market oriented sys-
tem would better protect computer programs. Under their system, they
would establish "a legal regime that would not restrict appropriations of
compiled know-how in programs any further than is necessary to avoid
market failure and restore the kind of healthy competition that occurs when
innovators enjoy sufficient natural lead time."' 96
Programmers would enjoy a monopoly over the product for a period of
time necessary to recoup the investment that they made in the product. 197
After that time, competitors would be able to enter the field with their own
version of the product. The authors provide three considerations to deter-
mine the length of the monopoly:
(1) the nature and size of the software entity or component that has
been imitated; (2) the means by which a second comer obtains ac-
cess to such an entity and the degree of dependence (or independ-
ence) of a second comer's creation; and (3) the degree of similarity
between the products and markets of the original and second com-
ers. 1
98
This new approach has also received much criticism. First, some crit-
ics argue that the principle idea of the authors of the Manifesto, namely that
193 Id. at 2367-68 (citations omitted).
"9 See generally, Samuelson, supra note 92.
19 Id. at 2361-62.
196 Id. at 2365.
197 Id.
191 Id. at 2378 (citations omitted).
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the present system is not able to handle computer software, is not true.199
For example, Robert Gorman believes that the present system adequately
protects computer programs.200
Professor Gorman also states that there are enough conflicts in the law
trying to incorporate various other intellectual property regimes (patent,
copyright, trademark, etc.), and that adding an additional regime will only
complicate the matter. 20' Finally, Professor Gorman notes that while sev-
eral people have posited a sui generis approach, almost nobody has con-
cretely set forth a model code and true implementation plan, so the idea
continues to exist only in the abstract 22
VII. THERE ARE PROBLEMS THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED IN ALL
SOLUTIONS
One of the major continuing problems is that prior international intel-
lectual property agreements managed harmonization through a program of
national treatment of commerce in objects or activities located in a particu-
lar jurisdiction. However, today's global computer networks are "rapidly
undermining the whole concept of territorially-limited intellectual property
rights."203 This territorial approach also faces great hurdles in the face of
new methods of commerce where computer programs can be downloaded
from remotely located servers onto the user's computer, or even run from
those servers that are located in different areas from where the user's termi-
nal is located.
Additionally, computer software protection must ensure the interop-
erability of computer software systems. 2 4 This must be done on both the
micro level at the user's computer, as well as the overall workings of local
area networks, wide area networks, and the "information superhighway." If
software makers tightly controlled their source and object codes, as well as
the programs behavior, communications among different computer pro-
grams and platforms would become more difficult as conflicts between
programs hindered their interoperability.
If this scenario were taken its extreme limits, this would lead to an
ever-increasing balkanization of computers. Software programmers would
have to engineer an entire suite of programs and platforms for any one user,
because there would be no guarantee that the user could integrate another
program or platform. For the user, this would reduce choice and force them
"' See generally Robert A. Gorman, Commentary: Comments on a Manifesto Governing
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 5 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 278 (1996).
200Id.
201 Id. at 283.
202 See generally, Gorman, supra note 199.
2013 McManis, supra note 20, at 226.
2
04 Id. at 232.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 22:261 (2002)
to choose among discrete packages that included everything from their op-
erating system, to the programs used daily.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The protection of computer software under the TRIPS agreement ap-
pears to be both an advance and a loss for the computer software industry.
The final outcome will depend on the way in which each of the individual
countries chooses to craft their own domestic legislation.
It is clear, that protection of the source and object codes as literary
works is an advance. Under the prior Berne convention, even this level of
protection was left to the individual countries. Therefore, wholesale copy-
ing of the code could occur legally in those countries that failed to provide
copyright protection for software programs. This effectively left the com-
puter programmers with little possible recourse.
Similarly, under the Paris Convention, there was no clear direction
about whether or not programs could be patented. Therefore, the world
broke into two separate camps. First, some countries would not allow any
form of patent unless the program was able to manifest itself in some sort of
physical expression. The second group patented computer programs per se.
Under the new TRIPS regime, programs are protected as literary
works. This provides computer programmers with the usual rights available
to copyright holders. The most important of which is the bar against unau-
thorized copying or reproduction. Furthermore, this right is supported by
an aggressive dispute settlement system. Because of the unique properties
of the TRIPS agreement, it is possible to affirmatively affect the legislation
and enforcement of copyright law in countries. Not only can a signatory
force another signatory to adopt compliant legislation, they can also chal-
lenge the means and adequacy of enforcement of those legislative goals.
TRIPS does not, however, afford copyright protection for the behavior
or functional aspect of the program. This is partly because of the traditional
boundaries of copyright protection for nonuseful aspects of inventions.
Historically, patent law protected such useful inventions.
TRIPS does not foreclose the possibility that a computer program, or
its behavior, could be patented. However it does not force such an out-
come. Therefore, it leaves the issue of the "pure software" patent unan-
swered. Each member state will be allowed to adopt their own legislation
on this matter.
To the extent that member nations provide copyright protection for the
object and source code, along with patent protection for the computer pro-
gram per se, the TRIPS agreement is a major advance over the previous
systems. However, countries, such as those that adhere to the EC Directive
on Computer Programs, will provide only nominal protection for computer
programs under copyright law and not patent law.
To date, the adoption of copyright protection among developed, devel-
oping and nondesignated countries has been a success. This suggests that
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broad copyright protection among all members will be achieved in the fu-
ture. However, the patentability of computer programs as such has not re-
ceived such worldwide consensus. The developed world continues to
remain divided into two camps. Additionally, few of the developing coun-
tries have notified the TRIPS Council of their legislation. Therefore, it is
not clear what the future holds for computer patent protection. However, if
the current state is any indication, it seems clear that the world will continue
to remain divided under the TRIPS regime.
The hope is that more countries will follow the dual protection model
conceptualized by the United States. However, there are legitimate con-
cerns about this model. Therefore, perhaps it is best to provide for a shorter
patent period for computer programs in order to ensure that competitors are
allowed to build on the software, while still allowing computer companies
to recoup their initial research and development costs.
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